Family Reputation

The domain in which I usually have the strongest reputation is with my family. My family is comprised of my two parents and my younger siblings. I am the oldest in my family with one brother who is three years younger than me and twin sisters who are seven years younger than me. Personal reputation amongst family is unique in that it has been developed over the span of an entire lifetime. Each action that I have taken over the course of that time contributes to my reputation as a whole, especially in the eyes of those who are able to judge it best (based on the passage of time): my parents. It is also unique in that the people who judge my reputation are the very people who I live with and are closest to me.

My personal successes both socially and academically have contributed the strong reputation I have in my family. For example, events such as that described in my earlier post “Opportunism - Getting Out of a Pickle” are the events that routinely characterize me and contribute to my reputation. By choosing a route that characterizes that “hard work will always pay off in the end”, I have conveyed that I am a hard working individual to my family. Throughout childhood, academics surround a person’s reputation. Parents brag about their children being honors students, getting good grades and even projects. In contributing to a parent’s own reputation, good students can also develop their own reputation that conveys they are not only competent but hard working. Following this assumption, my academic success further contributes to my reputation. I have been quite successful academically as I was most always an honors student and am now attending the University of Illinois where my academic success has stayed consistent with that of my performance throughout K-12. Throughout every event, I have shown that I am also reliable to both my siblings and my parents. I have made a point to put family first in my decisions and it has further enhanced my reputation.

I must also realize that my reputation in my family affects each of my siblings’ performances. As the oldest child, I have first and foremost set the precedence for each child in my family in my performances socially, academically and in how I have built my character. This motivates me to perform as best as I can to serve as a role model to my siblings and use my reputation to motivate their own performances. For example, if I achieve success academically, my siblings will look up to me and be motivated to also achieve the same success. My reputation is then further enhanced by serving as this role model. As a role model to my siblings, there is little moral value for me to stray from the behaviors that give me a strong reputation. I must consistently serve as this person for the better of my siblings. 

Constantly keeping my reputation intact and enhancing it also gives me the opportunity to take advantage and in a way “cash it in”. As every college student might, I use my previous reputation acquired to gain the occasional Illinois hoodie or other souvenir when my family comes to visit me or when I am back at home. I can use the argument that, “I have been working so hard” or something along those lines to convince my parents to do these things. I this way, I am using my perviously established reputation for a personal gain. I may not be completely abandoning my reputation or even harming it but I am able to take advantage of my position to make an immediate gain.

Triangle: Government, Dairy, and Other Interests

I recently read a 1999 economic article titled “‘If It’s Yellow, It Must Be Butter’: Margarine Regulation in North America Since 1886" by Ruth Dupre. The paper uses George Stigler’s economic theory of regulation and interest group theory of government to analyze why exactly the margarine industry was so heavily restricted from the end of the nineteenth century through the end of the twentieth century. I would like to point out an example of a triangle like arrangement in the midst of the regulations passed against the margarine industry.

First, a little background is necessary. The invention of margarine created a fire under the seats of dairy farmers throughout North America. As dairy farmers were the producers of butter, the product margarine sought to substitute, they had the most to lose in the event margarine were to take a strong hold on the market. Dairy industry lobbyists then pushed, supposedly in the “public interest”, for laws that went from bans on artificial “butter yellow” coloring of margarine to total prohibition (354). Up until World War I, beef fat and cottonseed oil were the fats used in the production of margarine in the US, and their corresponding industries, Western cattle farmers and Southern cotton growers, fought the dairy lobby (360). After new processes for hardening fat were created in Europe around 1920, coconut oil became a large part of the margarine industry and domestic interests, cattle and cotton, became much less interested in fighting the dairy lobby and much more interested in getting their products into margarine (360). Over the next twenty years, margarine slowly regained the support of these domestic industries and started to fight against dairy once again (361). 

In the face of similar examples of conflicting interests is where the triangle arrangement lies for government legislators. In particular, the Ontario government was, “torn between two agricultural lobbies: the dairy producers and the soybean growers,” after ‘domestic fat laws’ were passed to stop the use of European coconut oil (360, 361). It is important to note that until this point of this conflict between lobbies, margarine was totally prohibited in Ontario. The dairy industry and the soybean industry accounted for a large part of Ontario’s agricultural economy, and were fighting each other for policies exactly opposite of one another. The Ontario government had the conflicting task of creating policies that somehow appealed to both interests. As each economy had high stakes to gain or lose associated with the passing of any kind of law, the government could not simply appeal to only one interest without simultaneously harming the other interests and themselves. In a manner of speaking, the government had to create regulations in which each party would lose the least. Even more simply spoken: the government had to create a compromise. 

In the case of Ontario’s dilemma, Dupre does not go in to detail but directly states that Ontario chose, “the compromise of a coloring regulation” (361). Compromises seem to have become the ideal strategy to resolve such triangle arrangements and dependent upon the circumstances, there may be no “correct” way to create a compromise. There is a great amount of negotiation involved in these situations, and in many cases, the options are nearly endless. With the daunting task of choosing one of nearly endless compromises, each end of the triangle is pressured to come to a consensus. This pressure continues until an agreement is made, or the parties may enter a cycle of negotiation that may go against the self interest of each party. 

References: 

Dupré, Ruth. “‘If It’s Yellow, It Must Be Butter’: Margarine Regulation in North America Since 1886." The Journal of Economic History. Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 353-371.